WORKSHOP SHORT REPORT FORM FOR RAPPORTEURS

Number and title of special session SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN IN A DEFENCE MINISTRY

Date and time of workshop 1830 to 2000, Friday 17 November

Moderator (Name and Institution) Hugette Labelle

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Panellists (Name, institution, title)

Mark Pyman, TI UK, defence project leader
Burak Bekdil, Defense News, Turkish Daily News, journalist
Maciej Wnuk, Polish Ministry of National Defense, director of ethics
John Githongo, St Antony’s College, Oxford, assoc member
Ana Glenda Tager, Interpeace, regional director

Main Issues Covered

Corruption has to a certain extent retreated to the security sector in Africa. How can this be tackled? In Africa in particular, the security sector is last area that one finds corrupt activity, prevalent and sometimes justified by people in the sector. It is particularly damaging because of the relative size of the sector in Africa, and because of the prevalence of corruption within the security sector. Corruption has a significant effect, because it involves forces with a rigid rank culture, corruption seeps down quickly and has quite an impact.

The Turkish military is criticized (eg by EU) for having failed to reform. How can such reform be effected? So far, Turkey has been under pressure to reform by EU and NATO. In 2003, Turkey was stripped of its power to appoint military officers to boards that oversee broadcasting and education. But there has been no further work on oversight of military budget, and extra budgetary funds are not scrutinised by parliament. Reform is undermined by the military which privately views the government as a threat in terms of protecting the country from political Islam. yet, according to opinion polls, 80% of the Turkish population regard the military as the most trusted institution, whereas government only gets 20%. A lack of transparency in civilian sector is why government is not widely trusted. The Government therefore will find the task of making the case for greater civilian and democratic control of the military very difficult until it reforms itself.

How to approach security sector reform in a country transitioning to democracy, with particular reference to Guatemala. Transforming one sector will affect the other. One must therefore consider the judiciary, intelligence and defence sectors all together. This is an important point in countries undergoing transition to democracy.

An outline of Transparency International UK’s defence sector work. Our work involves building awareness, monitoring, engaging with defence companies, securing exporting government support.

An overview of recent security sector reform efforts in the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Poland is consider the most corruption country in EU. The defence sector is a high corruption risk.
Main Outcomes

Turkey’s failure to ensure greater oversight of military budget and parliamentary scrutiny of extra budgetary funds must be addressed. This is applicable to many other countries.

As the protector against all foreign and domestic threats, the Turkish military can shirk the reform which government is trying to impose on it, as it privately views the government as a domestic threat.

Proper civilian control of government is prerequisite for democratic control of military (reference Turkey). The government cannot credibly push for the reform of the military until it is itself reformed such that it is transparent and accountable.

Corruption in security leads to the sector (eg the military) bleeding expenditures from other sectors

Security sector reform requires a holistic approach – intelligence, police, military must be tackled simultaneously and in tandem with reform of the judiciary.

Security sector reform must seek to strengthen democratic control, efficiency of institutions and promote regional initiatives.

Independent expertise, tender reviews, civil oversight and IPs, civilian procurement, independent reviews and interviews, electronic procurement, guide for control of offsets, confidence in external relationships are key to defence procurement reform.

Efforts by the Polish Ministry of Defence to fight corruption include: the appointment of an ethics director to create and implement an anti-corruption policy, efforts to fight conflicts of interest among members of tender commissions through strict enforcement of rules, greater competition in procurement, and more information on procurements, prosecutions (recently a general was charged for the first time in a corruption case), implementation Defence Integrity Pacts on VIP aircraft and transport helicopters, use of electronic auctions

Lessons in the Poland reform process include how valuable outside experts are, how important consistent application of the rules is, the enhancement of procedures rather than relying on personnel changes

EU accession pressure can be leveraged to stimulate reform, as in the case of Turkey. Although support diminishes as painful reforms are carried out. For instance, popular support for EU membership was 75% but is now 33%, so there is less of an appetite for reform in the name of EU membership. Turks uncertain why EU so fixated on reform of just the military.

Reform must not simply involve copying other military models – this solution is inadequate, as particular circumstances differ per country.

Main Outputs

Greater awareness of the issue of corruption in the security sector, in particular how it undermines security, democracy and development.

Increased understanding of how civilian oversight can increase accountability, transparency and fight corruption in the defence and security sectors.
Recommendations, Follow-up Actions

It would be most useful to publish the identities of the 12 key African arms agents (mostly small arms).

The military grip on government must be loosened for the government to democratically control the military (reference Turkey)

Periodic reviews of the Ministry of Defence are most useful, and can catalyse reform, as in the case of the Colombian Ministry of Defense which was reviewed by TI Colombia (TPC)

The TI UK defence team is looking for national chapters with which to collaborate on defence ministry reform.

The Polish parliament has enacted new regulation to institute a 3 year cooling off period after leaving office. This may be an effective way of combating the revolving door syndrome. To be effective, it is essential that this is enforced.

A ranking of security sector institutions across the world may be a useful catalyst for reform.

Workshop Highlights (including interesting quotes)

The soft underbelly of defence procurement is the commercial debt which is incurred to finance the procurement. This debt should be audited and will throw up a lot of information and a few surprises. Comparisons between what one country pays compared to another, including interest rates on these debts will reveal a lot of surprises. (John Githongo)

Proper civilian control of government is a prerequisite for democratic control of military. In a democracy, civilian control over military is sina qua non, but so is civilian control over the government. Government therefore must first reform itself first (Burak Bekdil)

“We want to be the leader in implementing a-c solutions” (Polish Defence Minister Sikorski as quoted by Maciej Wnuk)

Signed Dominic Scott